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In modern microeconomics, a firm associates various inputs and a specific technology to reach 
a particular level of production. The theory of frontiers has defined the notion of a maximum level of 
production that can be reached given the inputs and the technology available. Such a frontier becomes 
a reference for the producers in the sense that all firms are affected during the production process by 
productive inefficiencies. 
 These inefficiencies have been studied by the econometricians interested in estimating 
frontiers of cost. Originally proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977), a frontier model consists of a function of the usual regression type with an error term 
comprising various parts. The first part corresponds to the usual white noise process while the second 
part represents inefficiency. As it is well established in the literature, global inefficiency of individual 
sample firms can be predicted on the basis of cross-sections or panel data sets on these firms. The 
method based on cross-sectional data suffers from one serious difficulty: The estimation procedure 
must assume that inefficiency is independent of regressors. This might be incorrect since input and 
output quantities are together determined at the equilibrium and since firms may know something 
about their level of inefficiency when they choose inputs quantities. 
Now consider the incentives for cost reduction faced by a producer during the production 
process. This article provides two examples to show that the cost frontier of this producer involves a 
global inefficiency term that comprises two terms. The first component is a purely exogenous random 
term; the second one is endogenous in the sense that it depends on the producer’s actions and hence on 
observable variables in an indirect and imbricated way. This decomposition of global inefficiency 
resembles the specification commonly used in the literature on stochastic frontiers. However, it is here 
endogenously derived while, in the tradition of stochastic frontiers, it is imposed in ad hoc way. 
This resemblance finds its source in the economic literature. On one side, a tradition initiated 
by Leibenstein (1966) motivates the specification of stochastic frontiers. Without referring explicitly 
to the notion of frontier, Leibenstein clearly mentions the existence of a global inefficiency that 
depends on the will of managers and workers in a production process. A low powered incentive 
environment due to a lack of productivity of working agents induces the inefficiency, while 
appropriate incentives can lead to significant operating cost reductions.  
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On the other side, since the emergence of the new theory of regulation, economists admit that, 
in industries where a producer is regulated by an authority, the principal-agent relationship is at the 
core of the question of assessing the performance of a firm. (See Loeb and Magat, 1979, Baron and 
Myerson 1982 and Laffont and Tirole 1986.) Hence, technical inefficiency and effort are two 
unobservable parameters, which characterize the incentives faced by a firm to reduce costs and define 
the source of global inefficiency.  
Likewise, in industries where several producers enjoy a local monopoly power, a sudden 
opening of the market to perfect competition may create a new pressure in terms of incentives for 
carriers to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
In this perspective, incentive models provide a relevant framework for the analysis of cost 
frontiers. In addition, because such models are able to elicit the structural relationship between the 
observable variables and the inefficiency term, they directly provide a way to deal with the 
endogeneity of the inefficiency term, i.e., with the stumbling block of the econometrics of stochastic 
frontiers.  
The analysis presented below is based on two examples of cost reduction incentives. The first 
one focuses on the regulatory structure drawn from the French urban transport industry. There are two 
types of contracts that regulate the activity of transport operators, and these types of contracts provide 
operators with different incentives to reduce costs. This analysis is based on the work by Gagnepain 
and Ivaldi (2002). A second example is the deregulation of European aviation. Until the beginning of 
the 1980s, flag operators have enjoyed monopoly power and have kept costs and prices high. The 
introduction of several waves of deregulation form 1985 to 1993 has allowed competition in the 
European industry, forcing firms to be more efficient and to reduce costs if they wanted to stay in the 
market. This analysis is based on the work by Gagnepain and Marin (2005). 
Section 1 presents the preliminary cost frontier to be estimated using a Cobb-Douglas 
technology. Section 2 is devoted to the way incentives for cost reduction are introduced in this cost 
frontier. Section 3 and 4 present two applications on the urban transportation in France and 
deregulation of European airline respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
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1. The preliminary frontier 
 
The aim of this section is to construct the structural cost and production frontiers of a transport 
operator. First, preliminary frontiers, that are conditional on effort, are obtained. Second, using the 
regulatory or the competitive constraints, we construct structural frontiers to be estimated.  
We specify a stochastic production function as 
 
(1) ( ) YegXfY εθα +−+= ),(lnln , 
 
where ( , )f X α  is the production function, i.e., the locus of technically efficient production levels. 
Here, the levels of output and inputs are given by Y and X respectively. The parameter Yε  is a 
symmetric statistical noise which accounts for measurement errors. Moreover, 0≥θ  is the exogenous 
technical inefficiency, and e ≥ 0  is the effort of productivity exerted by the firm. Technical 
inefficiency represents the amount of knowledge, the experience of the transport operator and its 
ability to associate inputs with the technology available. The cost reducing effort is exerted in order to 
reduce the technical inefficiency θ . The function ( )θ−eg  provides then a measure of the global 
inefficiency. The nature of this function depends on the source of inefficiency and effort activity in the 
production process. We assume that ( ).g  is strictly increasing with θ  and strictly decreasing with e. 
A measure of the total distortion under the production frontier is naturally defined by the ratio 
 
(2) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]θεα −= egXfY Y expexp, , 
 
which tells us how far is actual output from the most efficient production level represented by the 
stochastic production function ( ) ( ), exp Yf X α ε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
 The regulator does not know neither θ  nor e. In order to provide the level of output Y, a 
transport operator requires quantities of input njX j ,...1=  , , from a set X of inputs. The utilization and 
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the management of the set of inputs are affected by technical inefficiency θ . This leads to an over-
consumption of the inputs. By exerting a significant level of effort, the monopoly can reduce this 
excess of factors demand. 
Then we distinguish iX  from 
*
iX . On one hand, iX  is the physical amount of input i used by 
the producer in the process. This amount is observable by the regulator. On the other hand, *iX  is the 
efficient level of input i which is not observable by the regulator. Hence, operating costs depend on the 
quantity iX  whereas the actual level of production depends on 
*
iX . The relationship between 
observed and efficient quantities of input i is given by 
 
(3) ( )e
XX ii −= θexp
* , 
 
that is to say, the efficient quantity is expressed as a percentage (measured by ( )exp eθ − ) of 
observed quantity. Note that θ  is expected to be greater than e. However, we do not impose this 
constraint when we estimate the model. 
Consider now a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
(4) ( )[ ]Yn
j
j egkXAY kj εθαα +−= ∏
=
exp
1
* , 
 
with one output and n variable inputs, where k stands for capital and kA α  ,  and the jα ’s are 
parameters describing the technology. Capital is considered as a fixed input. 
 We turn to the construction of the dual cost frontier. Assume that the producer seeks to 
minimize the cost C of producing its desired rate of output Y under technical inefficiency. The 
associated allocation of inputs sets the factor demand X j nj ,   = 1,... . The program of the producer is 
then  
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(5) ∑
=
n
lj
jjX
Xw
j
min , 
 
under the technological constraint (4), where wj  is the price of input j. The excess of factor demand 
above its frontier prevents the producer from reaching the theoretical level of production. Such a 
distortion of factor demands leads to a rise of operating costs. In logarithmic form, the associated 
stochastic cost frontier, ( ), , ,C Y w e θ , is given by 
 
(6) ( ) ( )
1
1ln , , , ln ln ln
n
j k
j C
j
e
C Y w e w Y k
r r r r
α θαθ ε
=
−= Κ + + − + +∑ , 
 
where ∑
=
=
n
j
jr
1
α  measures returns to scale, K is a constant and w is the vector of input prices. Note 
that the term ( ) re−θ  is the total cost distortion above the cost frontier. Global inefficiency is less 
significant when the industry enjoys large returns to scale r. 
 Both production and cost frontiers in Equations (4) and (6) respectively allow the 
econometrician to estimate a technology in a similar way. The choice between estimating one 
functional structure or the other depends upon exogeneity assumptions. A cost function should be 
rather considered if output quantities are exogenous. Nevertheless, in any case, both frontiers in 
Equations (4) and (6) are preliminary since the unobservable structure is partially endogenous. The 
cost reducing effort e is endogenous and depends on regulatory schemes or the competitive 
environment set by the regulator. 
 We turn now to the cost reducing activity aspect of the problem. 
 
2. Incentives 
 
 We consider a transport operator whose profit function is 
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(7) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , eR Y C Y w eπ θ ψ= − − , 
 
where R(Y) denotes its revenue. Exerting effort is costly and leads to internal cost ( )ψ e . A profit-
maximizing operator determines the optimal effort level in Equation (7). The first order condition is 
given by: 
 
(8) ( ) eCe −=′ψ , 
 
which states that the optimal effort level is chosen to equalize the marginal disutility of effort and the 
marginal costs savings. Let us define a specific functional form for the internal cost of effort: 
 
(9) ( ) ( )   ,1exp −= ee τψ  
 
where τ > 0 . Assume that ( ) 00 =′ψ . The first order condition (Equation 8) can then be expressed 
using the cost frontier (Equation 6) and the internal cost of effort (Equation 9). The level of 
endogenous effort exerted by the operator is obtained as 
 
(10) 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
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−+−+++Κ
=
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=
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1
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The optimal effort level depends on inputs prices wj , production level Y, capital stock k, the 
inefficiency θ  and the technology available α . The optimal effort level (Equation 10) is now 
reintroduced in the preliminary frontiers (Equation 6) in order to derive the final structural cost 
frontier to be estimated: 
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where CΗ  is a constant and r1+= τ
τξ . Note that, when the effort of the producer is nil, the structural 
cost frontier is given by the expression: 
 
(12) ,1lnln1
ln
ln
1
C
k
n
j
j
r
k
r
Y
rr
w
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=
 
 
We propose now two applications of this model. 
 
3. Regulation of public transit in France 
 
We use a database that has been created in the early 1980s. It assembles the results of an 
annual survey conducted by the Centre d'Etude et de Recherche du Transport Urbain (CERTU, Lyon) 
with the support of the Groupement des Autorités Responsables du Transport (GART, Paris), a 
nationwide trade organization that gathers most of the local authorities in charge of a urban transport 
network. For our study, we have selected all urban areas of more than 100,000 inhabitants for a 
purpose of homogeneity. However, the sample does not include the largest networks of France, i.e., 
Paris, Lyon and Marseilles, as they are not covered by the survey. The result is that the panel data set 
covers fifty-nine different urban transport networks over the period 1985-1993. 
In each urban area, a public authority is in charge to regulate the transit system which is 
provided by a single operator. The authority chooses the regulatory scheme that defines cost 
reimbursement rules and the final owner of commercial revenue at the end of the reference period, 
usually a year. Two types of contract are observed in practice. The first type corresponds to the so-
called cost-plus contracts. This contract is a very low powered incentive scheme, as firms under this 
regime have no incentives to produce efficiently, since all operating costs are reimbursed ex-post.  
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 With the second type of contract, the so-called fixed-price contract, the operator is residual 
claimant for effort. This time it obtains a transfer equal to the expected balanced budget, which is the 
difference between expected costs and expected revenue. This contract is a very high-powered 
incentive scheme as the operator is now responsible for insufficient revenues and cost overruns. 
 In the public transit industry, the network operator is better informed on labor inefficiency 
than the regulator. Note that labor costs represent more than 60% of total costs in this industry. Bus 
drivers play a decisive and acute role in operating the network, especially with respect to the flexibility 
and punctuality of operations in peak periods. First, bus drivers permanently meet the end users. Their 
behavior vis-à-vis the customers may perceptibly affect the quality of service during high peak 
periods. Indeed, the driver has to perform several tasks at the same time, selling tickets, monitoring the 
passengers' up-and-down movements, managing the use of bus seats and space. Clearly, these tasks are 
much harder to accomplish in period of traffic congestion. Moreover, drivers have to deal with social 
and security problems, particularly in areas where the underprivileged population is large. There is an 
additional feature worth to be mentioned. The network structure may affect the driving conditions. On 
a same network, each bus route has its own characteristics of traffic lanes, route length, road access 
that complicates the evaluation of drivers' skills. All these remarks have the same implication: 
Appraising efficiency by just looking at the observed quantity of physical input is more difficult in the 
case of labor than in the cases of materials and soft capital whose consumption can be more easily 
observed and monitored by the regulator. As a result, we distinguish between observed and efficient 
labor forces, i.e., between the physical amount of labor forces, that is the source of cost distortions and 
is observable by the authority, and the efficient level of labor required to produce the output. Since the 
behavior of drivers is the source of cost distortions, we assume that managers spend time and effort in 
monitoring drivers, providing them with training programs, solving potential conflicts, etc. Both labor 
technical inefficiency and cost reducing activity are unobservable to the regulator and to the 
econometrician. 
 The empirical work involves fitting the stochastic cost functions presented in Equation (11) 
and Equation (12) to this panel data set of French urban transport networks. We assume that the 
production process requires four inputs. These inputs are labor L, materials M, soft capital S and 
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capital k. To identify the cost reducing activity through effort, we need to consider that effort is nil 
under cost-plus regimes while it is optimal under fixed-price schemes. Hence, under fixed-price 
regimes, we would estimate Equation (11), while we would estimate Equation (12) under cost-plus 
contract. In the same database where both regulatory contracts are present, we consider the following 
function: 
 
(13) [ ]{ }( ){ } .lnlnlnlnlnln1          lnlnlnlnlnln 00 CLkYSSMMLL LkYSSMMLL kYwww kYwwwC εθβββββββρ θββββββξβρ +++++++− +++++++′=   
 
where ρ  takes value ρ = 1  for a fixed-price contract and ρ = 0  for a cost-plus contract. Note that 
only labor is considered as the potential candidate for primal inefficiency and asymmetries of 
information. The parameters in (13) are all functions of the production frontier parameters. Thus, 
ln ,β0 = Κ  rjj αβ = , SMLj ,,= , β y r= 1 , β αk k r= − , ( )ξ τ τ β= + L , and 
( ) ( )′ = + − − +β β β τ β β τ β0 0 0ln ln ln lnL L L . Computations are available from the authors. 
Estimating the Cobb-Douglas cost function requires measures on the level of operating costs, 
the quantity of output and capital and the input prices. Total costs C  are defined as the sum of labor, 
materials and soft capital costs. Output Y  is measured by the number of seat-kilometers, i.e., the 
number of seats available in all components of rolling stock times the total number of kilometers 
traveled on all routes. Capital k , which plays the role of a fixed input in our short-run cost function 
includes rolling stock. Since the authority owns capital, the operators do not incur capital costs. The 
average wage rate wL  is obtained by dividing total labor costs by the annual number of employees. 
Materials include fuel, spares and repairs. As the number of buses actually used mainly determines 
these expenditures, one derives an average price of materials wM  by dividing material expenditures 
by the number of vehicles. Soft capital includes commercial vehicles, computer service and office 
supplies. These charges are induced by the activity of network management. By dividing investment 
charges by the number of customer trips per year, one obtains the price Sw  of managing single 
consumer travel. Summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis are given in Table I. 
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 Table II presents the estimation. Table III lists the estimated technical inefficiency, effort 
levels and cost distortions over the frontier for the biggest networks included in our dataset. The other 
networks are available upon request. A distortion equal to 1.015, as in Toulouse for example, suggests 
that the observed operating costs are, on average, 1.5% above the frontier. Consider Figure 1 where we 
present our set of fifty-nine networks ranked according to their cost distortions. Figure 1 provides for 
each network, the level of the inefficiency parameter and indicates the type of contract used to regulate 
it. Note that three groups of networks are easily detected. The first group with the lowest levels of cost 
distortion gathers sixteen networks, all of which are managed under a fixed-price contract. The next 
twenty ones can be collected in a second group as all of them (but four networks) are regulated 
through a cost-plus contract. Finally the last twenty networks are assembled in a third group, almost 
equally shared between the two types of contract. Concerning the third group, we just conclude that 
technical inefficiency is so high that even a highly incentive scheme, such as a fixed-price contract, 
cannot cure the problem. These results show that, because we account explicitly for the effect of each 
type of contract on the cost function and that our sample covers a large spectrum of existing networks, 
we are able to fully recover the distribution of the efficiency parameter. 
Note that there are networks for which θ>e . Since we did not impose e>θ  in the course of 
the estimation, we obtained cases where the effort is slightly greater than inefficiency, implying 
negative cost distortions. In fact, these estimated negative cost distortions are not significantly 
different from 0. The estimated variances of the cost distortions are available upon request.  
 
4. The deregulation of European airlines. 
 
We study in this section the effect of liberalization on costs in the European airline industry, 
accounting for inefficiency and cost-reducing effort. Inefficiency and cost reducing effort are of 
particular importance when comparing industries subject to different incentives, or analyzing changes 
in firms' behavior after a structural change in the rules governing the market as it is the case here.  
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At the beginning of the 1980s, European aviation was regulated by restrictive bilateral air 
service agreements between the countries concerned. Most routes were served by a duopoly operating 
under perfect collusion, and the industry was characterized by a lack of incentives to improve 
efficiency. This situation allowed firms, in many cases subsidized by their governments, to increase 
costs inefficiently. Under the pressure of the US, several changes took place in the European market. 
First, in 1984-86, several governments started renegotiating their bilateral agreements allowing for 
entry and price reductions in a few international routes. Second, the European Community introduced 
three packages of measures in 1987, 1990 and 1992, respectively, leading to freedom to set 
frequencies, capacities and prices and free entry by European carriers in any international European 
route. This process of gradual liberalization left the industry open to international competition, 
introducing a significant variation in firms' incentives. 
 Simultaneously, European flag carriers got privatized and explicit permission by the EU 
authorities started to be necessary in order to receive any form of public subsidy. The new competitive 
pressure became the strongest incentive for carriers to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
Additionally, during the second half of the 1990s, European carriers organized themselves around 
code-sharing agreements and international alliances that emerged after long and complex processes of 
negotiation. 
 Here, we test several scenarios of incentive pressures against each other in order to identify the 
one that fits the data best. Before deregulation, European airline carriers were mainly public entities 
regulated by bilateral service agreements. Subsidies would generally allow these firms to completely 
cover costs. It is therefore assumed that before deregulation, any operator would behave as a non-
residual claimant firm and would not provide any effort at all. After deregulation, as already 
mentioned, the new competitive pressure as well as the abandonment of subsidizing practices would 
provide the operating firms with perfect incentives for cost and inefficiency reduction. We consider 
then that the optimal effort provided by a deregulated firm is given by the condition (10). The cost 
function to be estimated is then: 
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where ρ  takes value 1 if the firm operates in a deregulated industry and 0 if the firm operates in a 
regulated industry. Moreover, ASL denotes the average stage length, and NET is the size of the 
network. In the course of the estimation, several combinations will be assumed depending on the 
nature of the various deregulatory measures introduced in the European airlines market. 
The dataset has been constructed for the period 1985-1999 from raw data included in Digest of 
Statistics published by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Air Transport 
Statistics published by International Air Transport Association (IATA), and Economic Outlook 
published by the Economics and Statistics Department of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The companies under study are the flag carriers from the largest European 
countries affected by the European liberalization process, namely, Alitalia, Air France, Air Portugal, 
British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Sabena and SAS. 
The variables have been constructed as follows. Production, wages, capital and average stage 
length correspond to total operating expenses (ICAO), seat-kilometers available, flight crew salaries 
and expenses and maintenance and overhaul expenses over number of employees, fleet total number of 
seats, and total aircraft kilometers over total aircraft departures, respectively. Finally, the price of 
materials has been constructed as the average fuel prices for the carrier's home country and the OECD 
(published by OECD), weighted by the company's domestic and international operations respectively 
(ICAO). 
This equation is estimated under alternative scenarios related to the deregulatory packages 
introduced by the EU and the liberal bilateral agreements signed by the UK with other countries. The 
following distinctions are made: 1) model with no effort and no inefficiency term, 2) firms do not 
make any effort to reduce inefficiency after the introduction of deregulatory measures, namely, the 
effect of deregulation is not accounted for, 3) deregulation affects firms' behavior after the third E.U. 
package of measures in 1992, and 4) deregulation affects the behavior of the firms affected by the 
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introduction of liberal bilateral agreements, which are British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and Sabena, 
after 1985, and the remaining companies in 1993. The comparison of scenarios (3) and (4) allows us to 
identify whether the liberal bilateral agreements have any effect on firms' behavior. Finally, given that 
some new competitors like easyJet and Virgin, not included in the sample, started operating a 
significant number of international European routes during the period 1997-99, and this could bias our 
measure of rivals' prices, we construct scenario (3''), which is recovered from scenario (3) after having 
excluded the last two years of observations, namely 1998 and 1999. 
Results are presented in Table IV. The variables are significant and have the expected sign. 
Costs are increasing with wages and production, while they are decreasing with the size of the network 
and the average stage length. The alternative scenarios are tested against each other applying a test of 
non-nested hypothesis. (See Vuong, 1989.) The test shows that scenario (4) is rejected against scenario 
(3). This suggests that liberal bilateral agreements had a limited effect on firms' behavior, probably 
because they affected only a reduced number of routes. In addition, the results for scenario (3'') are 
consistent with those for scenario (3). 
Scenarios (1) and (2) are rejected against scenario (3), which includes an inefficiency measure 
and assumes that deregulation affects firms' behavior after the introduction of the third E.U. package 
of deregulatory measures in 1992. Given that scenario (1) represents the standard approach proposed 
by the literature focusing on oligopolistic competition, its rejection advocates the construction of 
models including these components and indicates that we have to be cautious when interpreting the 
results derived from other models. For instance, the results for scenario (3) suggest that the European 
airline industry is characterized by constant returns to scale, while scenarios (1) and (2) suggest the 
existence of increasing returns. More in particular, rejection of scenario (2) shows the importance of 
accounting for the effects of deregulation on firms' technology and inefficiency. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This article provides evidences indicating that a structural analysis is needed to well identify 
productive inefficiency. Indeed the global inefficiency of a production unit results from a technical 
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inefficiency that is exogenous and an endogenous effort that depends on technological and regulatory 
conditions in a very specific way. From a policy perspective, the main lesson is that, the compensation 
for inefficiency in public or private firms might be searched in the system of incentives and 
institutional constraints. 
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Table I: Descriptive statistics on the cost structure 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Total cost (103 FF) 117500.000 137731.000 
Wage (103 FF) 174.940 28.384 
Material price (103 FF) 26.311 31.386 
Soft capital price (103 FF) 8.000 5.918 
Capital (# vehicles) 143 134 
Production (103seat-kilometers) 151302.680 367805.920 
Labor share 0.573 0.128 
Material share 0.296 0.117 
Soft capital share 0.129 0.078 
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Table II: Estimation results 
 Standard model Asymmetric information model 
Parameters Estimation Standard error Estimation Standard error 
β O    0.3068 0.150 
β L  0.4285 0.041 0.4491 0.048 
Sβ  0.1027 0.011 0.0824 0.006 
β Y  0.0400 0.037 0.1825 0.022 
β K  0.7063 0.092 0.7010 0.048 
lnτ    4.2827 0.257 
ν    0.5931 0.035 
μ    1.8007 0.287 
σ ε  0.1300 0.012 0.0834 0.007 
Log-likelihood 0.549 0.594 
Sample size 531 531 
Note: The fifty-nine firm specific constant terms iβ  of the standard model are not reported here.  
They are available upon request.  
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Table III: Technical inefficiency, effort level and cost distortion for some networks 
 
Network Technical inefficiency Effort Distortion 
Aix 0.067 0.089 0.990 
Besançon 0.318 0.000 1.153 
Bordeaux 0.086 0.000 1.039 
Caen 0.749 0.103 1.337 
Cannes 0.646 0.000 1.337 
Clermont 0.155 0.000 1.072 
Dijon 0.120 0.000 1.055 
Grenoble 0.083 0.114 0.986 
Le Havre  0.266 0.000 1.127 
Lille  0.180 0.126 1.024 
Montpellier 0.131 0.110 1.009 
Nantes 0.104 0.117 0.994 
Nice  0.489 0.113 1.184 
Nîmes 0.035 0.097 0.972 
Rennes 0.484 0.000 1.243 
Strasbourg 0.806 0.117 1.363 
Toulon 0.064 0.000 1.029 
Toulouse 0.158 0.124 1.015 
Valence 0.111 0.000 1.051 
Note: Under cost-plus regulation, the effort level is equal to zero. 
Table IV. Cost Function Airlines 
 
Variable  Coeff. (1) (2) (3) (4) (3’’) 
Constant β0 1.095 
(0.724) 
-0.090 
(0.411) 
0.049 
(1.013) 
-0.292 
(0.747) 
-0.276 
(0.637) 
wLi  β1 0.437 
(0.065) 
0.393 
(0.037) 
0.318 
(0.071) 
0.375 
(0.076) 
0.326 
(0.073) 
Yi β3 0.864 
(0.065) 
0.933 
(0.063) 
1.009 
(0.067) 
1.028 
(0.060) 
1.051 
(0.057) 
NETi β5 -0.242 
(0.084) 
-0.228 
(0.088) 
-0.360 
(0.079) 
-0.368 
(0.078) 
-0.398 
(0.074) 
ASLi β6 -0.400 
(0.088) 
-0.381 
(0.053) 
-0.422 
(0.097) 
-0.345 
(0.083) 
-0.405 
(0.101) 
T βt 0.071 
(0.040) 
0.068 
(0.032) 
0.271 
(0.057) 
0.097 
(0.040) 
0.269 
(0.061) 
ei  ln(μ ) - - 3.754 
(0.214) 
5.088 
(0.821) 
3.969 
(0.256) 
Standard Deviation of θ   - 0.474 
(0.036) 
0.270 
(0.077) 
0.404 
(0.069) 
0.313 
(0.054) 
Standard Deviation of the 
error term 
 0.257 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.026) 
0.164 
(0.040) 
0.098 
(0.057) 
0.121 
(0.054) 
R2  0.87     
Vuong test. Scenario (3) 
against alternative scenarios 
 3.121 2.777  1.996  
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Values for the Vuong test below –2 favor the alternative model against model (3), and above 2 favor model (3) against the alternative model. 
Scenarios: (1) Deregulation has no effect (ei=0), and the model does not account for one-side inefficiency (θi=0). 
(2) Deregulation has no effect. 
(3) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1992.  
(4) Deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and after 1992 for the remaining companies. 
(3’’) As scenario (3) but dropping the observations for the last two years (1998-1999). Note that (3’’) and (3) cannot be tested against each other since they 
consider two samples of different sizes. 
In all scenarios but (1) the model accounts for one-side inefficiency term (θi  ≥ 0). 

  
Figure 1: Inefficiency and regulatory schemes 
Note: To each network are associated three data: The inefficiency level (white bar), the cost distortion (black 
bar) and the type of contracts (a black diamond refers to a fixed-price contract and an empty circle 
indicates a cost-plus contract. 
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